Most emerging human infectious diseases have an animal origin. Yet, while zoonotic diseases originate from a primary reservoir, most theoretical studies have principally focused on single-host processes, either exclusively humans or exclusively animals, without considering the importance of animal to human transmission for understanding the dynamics of emerging infectious diseases.
Here we aim to investigate the importance of spillover transmission for explaining the number and the size of outbreaks. We propose a simple stochastic Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model with a recurrent infection of an incidental host from a reservoir (e.g. humans by a zoonotic species), considering two modes of transmission, (1) animal-to-human and (2) human-to-human. The model assumes that (i) epidemiological processes are faster than other processes such as demographics or pathogen evolution and (ii) that an epidemic occurs until there are no susceptible individuals left. The results show that during an epidemic, even when the pathogens are barely contagious, multiple outbreaks are observed due to spillover transmission. Overall, the findings demonstrate that the only consideration of direct transmission between individuals is not sufficient to explain the dynamics of zoonotic pathogens in an incidental host.
Introduction
Recent decades have seen a surge of emerging infectious diseases (EIDs), with up to forty new diseases recorded since the 1970s [1] . Sixty percent of emerging human infectious diseases have an animal origin [1, 2] . The World Health Organization defines zoonotic pathogens as "pathogens that are natu- 5 rally transmitted to humans via vertebrate animals". The epidemics caused by EIDs impact the societal and economical equilibria of countries by increasing unexpected deaths, the need for health care infrastructures and by interfering with travel [3] . Moreover, the risk of EIDs being transmitted to humans from wildlife is increasing because of the recent growth and geographic expansion of human 10 populations, climate change and deforestation, which all increase the number of contacts between humans and potential new pathogens [1, 4, 5] . Given this, it is crucially important to understand how infections spread from reservoir, i.e. by spillover transmission.
There is numerous empirical evidence that the epidemiological dynamics of 15 infectious diseases is highly dependent on the spillover transmission from the reservoir (for the reservoir definition see Table 1 ). The start of an outbreak is promoted by a primary contact between the reservoir and the incidental host (i.e. host that becomes infected but is not part of the reservoir) leading to the potential transmission of the infection in the host population. Moreover, multi- 20 ple outbreaks are commonly observed during an epidemic of zoonotic pathogens in human population, for instance in the case of the epidemic of the Nipah Virus between 2001 and 2007 [6] . With regards to the Ebola virus, some twenty outbreaks have been recorded since the discovery of the virus in 1976 [7] . This number of outbreaks undoubtedly underestimates the total number of emer-25 gences because not all emergences necessarily lead to the spread of the infection from an animal reservoir to the host population [8] . While the reservoir has an important role for causing the emergence of outbreaks, the role of spillover transmission on the incidental epidemiological dynamics is rarely discussed.
Definitions of a reservoir
Authors Refs "any animal, person, plant, soil, substance or combination of any of these in which the infectious agent normally lives"
"all hosts, incidental or not, that contribute to the transmission to the target host (i.e. the population of interest) in which the pathogen can be permanently maintained"
Haydon et al. [10] "an ecologic system in which an infectious agent survives indefinitely" Ashford [11, 12] . Two other definitions have been proposed to clarify and complete the notion of reservoir in the case of zoonotic pathogens. On the one hand, Haydon et al. (2002) define the reservoir from a practical point of view in order to take into account all hosts epidemiologically connected to the host of interest (i.e. target host), to implement better control strategies. On the other hand, Ashford (1997) establishes a more generalizable definition: for a given pathogen there is a single reservoir. We will use Ashford's definition, i.e. a model where a pathogen is persistent in the environment of the incidental host.
Theoretically, pathogen spillover is often neglected and it is generaly as- and contagious pathogens inducing large outbreaks (R 0 > 1, Stage IV) [14] .
However, the role of the reservoir is not clearly defined, and spillover effects on the epidemiological dynamics are not discussed. [19] . However, this approach does not allow teasing apart the contribution of incidental host transmission from that of the transmission from the reservoir in modulating the dynamics of zoonotic pathogens.
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In this paper, we aim to provide general insights into the dynamics of a zoonotic pathogen (i.e. pathogens classified in stages II-IV) emerging from a reservoir and its ability to propagate in an incidental host. To do so, we developed a theoretical model that can dissociate the effect of between-host (i.e. direct) transmission from the effect of spillover (i.e. reservoir) transmission. A 65 multi-hosts process with a reservoir and an incidental host are considered. The epidemiological processes are stochastic, which is particularly relevant in the case of transmission from the reservoir and more realistic. The model makes a number of assumptions. First, the epidemiological processes are much faster than the demographic processes. Second, the pathogen in the reservoir is consid-70 ered as endemic and might contaminate recurrently the incidental host. Third, an individual cannot become susceptible after having been infected. As a consequence, the total number of susceptible individuals in the incidental host decreases during the epidemic. This is what is expected for an epidemic spreading locally during a short period of time (at the scale of a few thousands individuals 75 during weeks or months, depending on the disease and populations considered).
We then harness the model to predict the effects of both spillover transmission and direct transmission on the number and the size of outbreaks. Outbreaks occur when the number of cases of disease increases above what would normally be expected. We show that the recurrent emergence of the pathogen from the interest of this ratio is mostly the notion of threshold: in a deterministic model, for a pathogen to invade the population, R 0 must be larger than 1 in the absence of reservoir. In a stochastic model, the higher the R 0 the higher the probability for the pathogen to invade the population. In a SIR model, the basic reproduc-110 tive ratio R 0 equals to βN γ . Individuals in the recovered compartment do not contribute anymore to the transmission process. Since we assume that demographic processes are slower than epidemic processes, the number of susceptible individuals decreases during the epidemic due to the consumption of susceptibles by the infection until the extinction of the population.
Model
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To analyse the dynamics in the incidental host, three statistics will be studied (i) the mean number of outbreaks, (ii) the mean size of the recurrent outbreaks during an epidemic and (iii) the mean size of the largest outbreak occurring during an epidemic. We consider the appearance of an outbreak when the incidence of the infection exceeds the threshold c and define the maximum size 120 of an outbreak as the largest number of infected individuals during the largest outbreak.
Analysis of the model
Stochastic simulations. We performed stochastic individual-based simulations of the epidemics with spillover transmission, using rates as presented in Figure 2 , Approximation by a branching process. The epidemiological model with recurrent introduction of the infection into an incidental host by a reservoir can be 135 approximated by a branching process with immigration from the reservoir to the incidental host at the beginning of the infectious process (thus assuming that individual "birth and death rates of infected individuals" are constant during the starting phase of an outbreak). The individual birth and death rates are respectively βS, the transmission rate and γ, the recovery rate and the 140 immigration rate corresponds to the spillover rate τ N at the beginning of the infection. In other words we assume that the number of susceptibles is N to study the beginning of the infection, which is a good approximation as long as few individuals have been infected. We distinguish between two regimes in the incidental host, the subcritical regime when R 0 < 1 and the supercritical regime 145 when R 0 > 1. We suppose that at time t = 0 a single individual is infected by the spillover transmission.
Results
The epidemiological dynamics in the incidental host
As illustrated in Figure 3 depend both of the value of the direct transmission (R 0 ) and the effect of the reservoir (τ ).
What is the effect of the direct transmission on the number of outbreaks
165 when the effect of the reservoir is low?
Case of a barely contagious pathogen (R 0 < 1):
We aim at approximating the mean number of outbreaks in the case where the spillover transmission rate τ and the reproductive number R 0 are small (subcritical case corresponding to R 0 < 1). The method of approximation is the following: let us denote by S i the number of susceptible individuals at the beginning of the i-th excursion. During the i-th excursion, we set this number of susceptibles to its initial value S i , and consider that the rate of new infections is βIS i . We thus obtain a branching process with individual birth (infection) rate βS i and individual death (recovery) rate γ. When there is no more infected individuals, we compute the mean number of recovered individuals produced by this branching process excursion, denoted by E[K(S i , β, γ)], and make the approximation that where E[K(S i , β, γ)] can be computed and equals (see Appendix A):
(
In other words, the initial number of susceptible individuals for the i + 1-th excursion is the initial number of susceptible individuals for the i-th excursion minus the mean number of recovered individuals produced during the i-th excursion under our branching process approximation. We repeat the procedure for the i + 1-th excursion, and so on, until k satisfies S k > 0 and S k+1 ≤ 0 (no susceptible anymore). In order to be considered as an outbreak, an excursion has to exceed c individuals, where we recall that c is the epidemiological threshold. Under our branching process approximation, the probability for the i-th excursion to reach the epidemiological threshold (see Appendix A) is:
As a consequence, our approximation of the mean number of outbreaks (E[O(N, β, γ)])
reads:
where S 1 = N , and the S i 's are computed as described in (1).
When the spillover transmission is fixed and small, the mean number of outbreaks computed with the branching process is a good approximation compared R 0 > 1, the probability to have one large outbreak is high. Hence we make the approximation that one large outbreak occurs during the epidemic, and the total number of outbreaks (O total (N, β, γ) ) can be approximated by:
To be part of outbreaks occurring before the large one, an excursion has to satisfy two conditions (i) to have a size higher than the epidemiological treshold c, and (ii) to be of a size not too large otherwise it would correspond to the large outbreak.
To be more precise, this condition will correspond to the fact that the supercritical branching process used to approximate this excursion does not go to infinity. As a consequence, O bef ore (N, β, γ) can be approximated by (See
To approximate the number of outbreaks after the large outbreak (O af ter (N, β, γ)),
we need to know how many susceptible individuals remain in the population.
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The number of susceptibles consumed before the large outbreak is negligible with respect to the number of susceptibles consumed during the large outbreak.
Hence we can consider that the initial state of the large outbreak is N susceptibles, one infected individual and no recovered individual. The number of susceptibles remaining after the large outbreak can be approximated with the 195 deterministic SIR model.
The large outbreak stops when there is no infected individual anymore in the incidental host. Using thatṠ S = −βI = −β γṘ , we get:
which has one trivial solution (S i = N ) and a non-trivial solution with no explicit expression denoted N af ter (N, β, γ). After the large outbreak, the epidemiological threshold for the next excursions, denoted R 0 af ter , is subcritical Figure 6 : The number of outbreaks as a function of the spillover transmission (10 −6 < τ < 10 −1 ). The direct transmission is equal to 0.4.
What is the effect of the reservoir on the number of outbreaks?
We now focus on the effect of the spillover transmission with a pathogen barely contagious (R 0 < 1) on the number of outbreaks. Because we consider 215 the subcritical case (R 0 < 1), the excursions are small and at the beginning of the epidemiological dynamics, we make the approximation that the spillover transmission rate is constant equal to τ N , and the direct transmission rate is equal to βN I. Using Equation (8) in Singh and Meyer (2014) , we get the mean number of infections by the reservoir (m) during an excursion under this 220 branching process approximation [19] :
We know that the probability for an excursion to reach the epidemiological threshold c in order to be considered as an outbreak is (recall Equation (3) see details in Appendix A):
allowing the approximation of the probability that the excursion is not an outbreak (See Appendix C for details):
We deduce the probability for the excursion to reach the threshold c, (See Appendix C),
Now, we can study some limit cases of mp c to approximate the number of outbreaks and understand the effect of the spillover transmission.
When mp c is small, then the probability to have an excursion reaching the 230 epidemiological threshold c is small and the number of outbreaks will be small. then each spillover has a non negligible probability to become an outbreak that is why the number of outbreaks for a small spillover transmission rate is higher compared to smaller direct transmission.
When mp c is large, then the probability that the excursion is not an outbreak, (1 − p c ) m , is small leading to a large outbreak consuming a large number 240 of susceptible individuals. Then few outbreaks will emerge. In Figure 7a , when τ is large (τ > 10 −2 ), that is to say when a large number of spillover transmissions (m) arise, only one outbreak is observed because the large number of spillovers prevents the outbreak from dying out.
When mp c is close to one, each excursion has a non negligible probability to be an outbreak but the number of susceptible individuals consumed is small enough to allow further outbreaks making possible the appearance of multiple outbreaks. We get an approximation of τ for which multiple outbreaks are possible by solving mp c = 1:
(12) • In our approximating process, we have considered that during an excur-255 sion the number of susceptible individuals is constant, whereas in reality it is decreasing with time. As a consequence, to get the same number of outbreaks in the real process than in the approximation we have done, we need to choose a higher parameter τ .
• We have considered, in our approximating branching process, that when 260 a new individual is infected by the reservoir during an excursion then only one individual is still infected. In reality, there is at least one infected individual but there may be more. As a consequence, the spillover rate may be lower in the real process than in the approximation. 
What is the effect of the reservoir on the size of the largest outbreak?
Since no explicit expression of the size of the outbreak can be obtained with the deterministic model, we estimated it using numerical analyses. Figure 8 shows that the number of infected individuals during the largest outbreak increases with the direct transmission (R 0 ) and the spillover transmission (τ ). Furthermore, a large outbreak can even be observed for a pathogen 270 barely contagious (R 0 < 1) when the recurrent emergence of the pathogen is high (τ 10 −3 ).
Discussion
Zoonotic pathogens constitute one of the most pressing concerns with regards to future emerging diseases, but studies investigating the importance diseases are lacking. Indeed, most theoretical works only consider pathogen transmission between conspecifics for predicting disease epidemiology. Here, we build a stochastic SIR model to consider the statistical process underlying a spillover transmission. We draw on the model to predict the number and the The limitations of our approach are discussed.
In our results, the appearance of outbreaks depends on both the transmission from the reservoir and the direct transmission between individuals. Gen-290 erally, the occurrence of epidemics in humans is attributed to the ability of the pathogen to propagate between individuals. In the case of a single-host process, the notion of the basic reproductive ratio R 0 seems sufficient to evaluate the spread of the pathogen in a population entirely composed of susceptible indi-viduals. In EIDs, R 0 is also used to gauge the risk of pandemics. In this way, the pathogen from the reservoir, the three dynamics that define the three stages will depend on both the spillover transmission and the direct transmission of the pathogen between individuals. The results suggest that in the case of pathogen spilling recurrently over an incidental host, the direct transmission should not be the only parameter to consider.
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The presence of a reservoir and its associated recurrent spillovers dramatically impact the epidemiological dynamics of infectious diseases in the incidental host. Without transmission from the reservoir, the probability to have an outbreak when the pathogen is barely contagious only depends on the direct transmission between individuals, and the outbreak rapidly goes extinct. By 315 contrast, the results show that the recurrent emergence of the pathogen from a reservoir increases the probability to observe an outbreak. Spillover transmission enhances the probability to both observe longer chains of transmission and reach the epidemiological threshold (i.e. threshold from which an outbreak is considered) even for a pathogen barely contagious. Moreover, this coupling model 320 (reservoir-human transmission) allows the appearance of multiple outbreaks depending on both the ability of the pathogen to propagate in the population and the transmission from the reservoir. Zoonotic pathogens such as MERS, Ebola or Nipah are poorly transmitted between individuals [21, 17, 22, 6] yet outbreaks of dozens/hundreds/thousands of infected individuals are observed.
We argue that, as suggested by our model, the human epidemic caused by EIDs could be due to recurrent spillover from an animal reservoir.
In the case of zoonotic pathogens, it is of primary importance to distinguish between primary cases (i.e. individuals infected from the reservoir) and secondary cases (i.e. individuals infected from another infected individual) to 330 specify the control strategies to be implemented, in order to optimize the utilization of the public health resources. According to the stochastic SIR model coupled with a reservoir analysed here, the same dynamics can be observed depending on the relative contribution of the transmission from the reservoir and the direct transmission by contact with an infected individual (see Figure 4 ).
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For example, a large outbreak is observed either for a high spillover transmission or for a high direct transmission. Empirically, it is generally difficult to distinguish between these two pathways of transmission. Only in the case of non-communicable diseases it is easily possible to measure the importance of the recurrent transmission from the reservoir. Indeed, in this context, all infected 340 individuals originate from a contact with the reservoir. It is the case for the H7N9 virus where most human cases are due to a contact with infected poultry and for which approximately 132 spillovers have been listed during the epidemic of 2013 [23] . For pathogens that are able to propagate from one individual to another, it is difficult to know the origin of the infection, which can be estab-345 lished according to patterns of contacts during the incubation period [6, 17] .
Most often, if an infected individual has been in contact with another infected individual in his recent past, direct transmission is considered as the likeliest origin of the infection. However, both individuals might have shared the same environment and thus might have been independently infected by the reservoir.
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This leads to overestimating the proportion of cases that result from person-toperson transmission. Moreover, when the pathogen infects an individual and the latter does not produce secondary cases then the detection of emergence is unlikely. The proposed stochastic model makes it possible to understand the effects of the infection from the reservoir or from direct transmission on the 355 epidemiological dynamics in an incidental host when empirically this distinc-tion is difficult. Thereafter, the role of control strategies implemented could be evaluated in order to determine the better strategies.
We have considered that the reservoir is a unique population in which the pathogen can persist. The pathogen is then endemic in the reservoir and the 360 reservoir has a constant force of infection on the incidental host. The reservoir can be seen as an ecological system comprising several species or populations in order to maintain the pathogen indefinitely [10] . For example, bat and dromedary camel (Camelus Dromedarius) populations are involved in the persistence of MERS-CoV and in the transmission to human populations [24] . In 365 these cases, the assumptions of a constant force of infection can be valid because the pathogen is endemic. However, the zoonotic pathogens can spill over multiple incidental hosts and they can infect each other. In the case of the ebola virus, which infects multiple incidental hosts such as apes, gorillas and monkeys [25], the principal mode of contamination of the human population is non-human pri-370 mate populations. Moreover, the contact patterns between animals and humans is one of the most important risk factors in the emergence of avian influenza outbreaks [26] . These different epidemiological dynamics with transmission either from the reservoir or from other incidental hosts can largely impact the dynamics of infection observed in the human population, and the investigations 375 of those effects can enhance our understanding of zoonotic pathogens dynamics.
In this paper, we have argued that the conventional way for modelling the epidemiological dynamics of endemic pathogens in an incidental host should be enhanced to account for spillover transmission in addition to conspecifics transmission. We have shown that our stochastic SIR model with a reservoir 380 produce similar dynamics that those found empirically (see the classification scheme for pathogens from [13] ). This model can be used to better understand how the ways in which EIDs transmit impact disease dynamics.
Appendices
In this appendix, we derive results on the branching process approximation 385 stated in Section 3. The main idea of this approximation is the following: when the epidemiological process is subcritical (R0 < 1), an excursion will modifiy the state of a small number of individuals with respect to the total population size. During the i-th excursions, the direct transmission rate βSI will stay close to βS i I where S i denotes the number of susceptibles at the beginning of the In this section, we focus on the number of outbreaks when R0 < 1 and when the rate of introduction of the infection by the reservoir is small (τ 1). That is to say, we consider that each introduction of the infection by the reservoir occurs after the end of the previous excursion created by the previous introduction of the infection by the reservoir. According to Equation (C.1), this approximation is valid as long as the ratio τ /β is small. We first approximate the mean number of susceptible individuals consumed by an excursion. Let us consider a subcritical branching process with individual birth rate βS and individual death rate γ. As this process is subcritical, we know that the excursion will die out in a finite time and produce a finite number of individuals. Then from [27] , if we denote by K[S, β, γ] the total number of individuals born during the lifetime of this branching process (counting the initial individual), we know that:
where P denotes a probability, and hence
where E is the expectation. By definition, an excursion is considered as an outbreak only if the maximal number of individuals infected at the same time during this excursion is larger than an epidemiological treshold that we have denoted by c. Hence in order to approximate the number of outbreaks we still have to compute the probability for an excursion to be an outbreak. This is a classical result in branching process theory, and can be found in [28] for instance. P (S, β, γ) := P(more than c individuals infected at the same time) = γ/βS − 1 (γ/βS) c − 1 .
With these results in hands, the method to approximate the mean number of outbreaks is the following. First the probability that the first excursion is an
The number of susceptibles at the beginning of the second excursion is approximated by
The second excursion has a probability γ/βS 2 − 1 (γ/βS 2 ) c − 1 to be an outbreak. The number of susceptibles at the beginning of the third excursion is approximated by
and the third excursion has a probability γ/βS 3 − 1 (γ/βS 3 ) c − 1 to be an outbreak. And we iterate the procedure as long as there is still a positive number of susceptible individuals. This gives eq. (4).
B. Number of outbreaks in the supercritical case (R 0 > 1)
We now focus on the case R 0 = βN/γ > 1. In this case the approximating branching process will be supercritical and will go to infinity with a positive probability. In the case when the epidemic process describes small excursions, the branching process approximation is still valid, but in the case when it describes a large excursion, then a large fraction of susceptible individuals will be consumed and the branching approximation will not be valid anymore. However, as all the quantities (susceptible, infected and recovered individuals) will be large, a mean field approximation will be a good approximation of the process. Here the mean field approximation will be the deterministic SIR process, whose dynamics is given by:
Let us first focus on the small excursions occurring before the large one.
As they are small, they can be approximated by a branching process. Here, unlike in the previous section, the approximating branching process Z is supercritical, as βN > γ. We can compute its probability to drift to infinity:
As we will see, a supercritical branching process with individual birth rate βN and individual death rate γ conditionned to get extinct has the same law as a subcritical branching process with individual birth rate γ and individual death rate βN . Indeed, if we denote by Z n the successive values of this branching process, we get for every couple of natural numbers (n, k):
We used again in this series of equalities classical results on branching processes that can be found in [28] . As a consequence, if we denote by G[N, β, γ] the number of susceptible individuals consumed by the excursion of a supercritical branching process with individual birth rate βN and individual death rate γ conditionned to get extinct, we get:
And the probability for this excursion to have a size bigger than the epidemio-
As the number of susceptible individuals stays large until the large excursion 400 occurs, we may keep N as the initial number of susceptibles at the beginning of the excursions instead of replacing it by their mean value, as we have done in the previous section.
The different quantities we have just computed allow us to approximate the number of small excursions before the large excursion: in expectation, we have by the reservoir is constant equal to τ N , and that the direct transmission rate is equal to βN I. Making this approximation allows us to treat the two processes of infection (by contact and by the reservoir) independently. Second, using a result of Singh and Myers (2014), we get the mean number of independent 415 infections by the reservoir during an outbreak under our approximation [19] . As the infections by the reservoir during an outbreak describe a Poisson process, we know that their times are uniformly distributed during the outbreak. As a consequence, we make the approximation that the successive local maxima of the number of infected individuals during the outbreak corresponds to the 420 successive maxima of the outbreaks generated by the independent infections by the reservoir. However, we have to take into account the fact that there is at least one infected individual remaining in the population when a new individual is infected by the reservoir (otherwise the new infected individual would generate a new outbreak). Hence we will make the approximation than the event 'the 425 excursion does not hit the treshold c' and the event 'no excursion generated by an infection by the reservoir and with initially two infected individuals, hits the treshold c' are equivalent. Notice that by doing that we underestimate the probability of an excursion to reach any threshold we may explain why we overestimate the spillover transmission τ maximizing the number of outbreaks.
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Let us denote by m the mean number of infections by the reservoir during an excursion (including the first infection) in our approximation (rate τ N of infection by the reservoir, and rate βN I of direct infections). Then, according to Equation (8) in [19] ,
Next, recall that the probability for an excursion of the subcritical branching process with individual birth rate βN and individual death rate γ and initial state 2 to hit the size c is
Hence we make the approximation that P(excursion is not an outbreak) ∼ (1 − p c ) m .
As the approximating branching process is subcritical, the probability p c is small. Hence, we pursue the approximation by saying
This approximation is valid only if mp 2 c is small, as when mp 2 c is small. Hence, if mp c is small, few outbreaks will hit the treshold, and the number of outbreaks will be small. If mp c is large, (1−p c ) m is small and the outbreaks will be big, consuming a large number of susceptible individuals.
As a consequence, there will be few outbreaks. The case mp c of order one is the more favorable for outbreaks, as in this case every excursion will have a non negligible probability to be an outbreak, but will be small enough not to consume to many susceptible individuals, allowing other outbreaks to occur.
Hence we get an approximation of the optimal τ by solving mp c = 1, which yields: 
